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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
DAVID DANIEL QUINT ANA, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
Case No. 20080120 
Dist. Court No. 071900760 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt by a jury for Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first-degree felony in 
violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8, and Possession of a Controlled Substance within 
a Drug-Free Zone, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8. 
The Defendant was found guilty on October 31, 2007. The Defendant was 
sentenced to a term of five years which may be for life in the Utah State Prison 
on the first-degree felony. He was also sentenced to a term zero to five years in 
the Utah State Prison on the second-degree felony. The Defendant is currently 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A 
DRUG FREE ZONE? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under a correction of 
error standard of review. This Court should use a question of law standard of 
review. uWe reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as 
a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State 
v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, this Court 
should review the evidence "in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," State 
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and reverse the Defendant's 
conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (citations and 
quotations omitted). Since Defendant's attorney didn't move for a directed 
verdict it should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review. u[T]o 
establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an 
alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§58-37-8(l)(a). Prohibited acts -- Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter^ it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17(P) 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of 
all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser 
included offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
David Quintana was charged in the Second District Court of Weber 
County with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
first-degree felony, and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree 
felony, which was enhanced to a second-degree felony because the possession 
was within a drug-free zone. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. 
David Quintana is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison and timely 
filled a motion to appeal on January 23, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Weber Morgan Narcotic Strike Force ("Strike Force") set up a 
controlled buy on January 27, 2006. The Strike Force was contacted by Patrick 
Anderson who had previously worked as a Confidential Informant for the 
Strike Force on roughly four to five other occasions. (R. 130/127) Mr. 
Anderson then volunteered to work as a Confidential Informant for the Strike 
Force on January 27, 2006. (R. 130/124) In previous instances, Mr. Anderson 
would give information to the agents regarding buying, selling, and associating 
with drug dealers and narcotics. (R. 130/125) On the date of January 27, 2006, 
Mr. Anderson came to the strike force to offer some information regarding 
David Quintana. (R. 130/126). Mr. Anderson then negotiated with the Strike 
Force to engage in controlled buy from David and would get paid by the Strike 
Force for performing controlled buys. (R. 130/127|) 
On January 27, 2006 Mr. Anderson met with agents Shawn Grogan and 
Juston Dickerson at a church parking lot near David Quintana's residence. (R. 
130/134) At that time, Mr. Anderson was searched, given a recording device 
and marked money. (R. 130/134) Mr. Anderson then headed towards David 
Quintana's house with the instruction to make a buy and then leave. (R. 
130/134) 
Once Mr. Anderson arrived at David's hou$e, he waited outside for eight 
to ten minutes. (R. 130/138) Mr. Anderson was then invited inside by David 
Quintana and walked to the back of the home. (R, 130/139) Mr. Anderson then 
arranged to purchase a specific quantity of methamphetamine from the 
Defendant. (R. 130/141) Mr. Anderson then paid David the $200 that the 
police Strike Force had provided him. (R. 130/146) David then measured out 
the correct eight-ball quantity and handed it to Mi Anderson. (R. 130/144) Mr. 
Anderson then put the drugs in his pocket, walked out of the house, walked 
around the corner, and got into the vehicle with Agent Dickerson. (R. 130/167) 
At that point, Mr. Anderson gave Agent Dickerson a baggie of 
methamphetamine. (R. 130/167) The baggie was later tested and found 
positive for 3.3 grams of methamphetamine. (1^. 130/227) After giving the 
baggie to Agent Dickerson, they returned to the church parking lot. (R. 
130/170) The officers then paid Mr. Anderson, searched him, and then he left. 
(R. 130/171) 
On February 10, 2006, other officers were at David's home to arrest him 
for other warrants issued. (R. 130/172) At that time, Agent Grogan took the 
warrant that he had prepared to a judge to get it signed while the other officers 
waited for over an hour outside of David Quintana's home. (R. 130/172) The 
officers then entered the home of David Quintana and performed a search. (R. 
130/174) During the search the officers located a small baggie of 
methamphetamine in the kitchen freezer. (R. 130/174) The agents then took 
this baggie and placed it in evidence at the Ogden Police station. (R. 130/177) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant, David Quintana, was convicted possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that David Quintana distributed a controlled substance or that the 
controlled substance found in his home during a warrant search belonged to 
him. The only evidence the State offered was the testimony of a previous drug 
user and convict, who acted as a confidential informant. Further, the baggie of 
methamphetamine found during the search was taken to the state lab and tested 
for fingerprints, and the test came back inconclusive. In addition, when the 
officers entered Defendant's home, there were |wo other individuals in the 
home which the baggie could have belonged Ito. The conduct that David 
Quintana engaged in did not rise to the level possession or intent to distribute a 
controlled substance. Since the State was unable to prove the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, this Court should reverse his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A 
DRUG FREE ZONE. 
The due process clause "protects the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
In the case at bar, the State provided insufficient evidence to prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court should only overturn a 
conviction for insufficient evidence "when it js apparent that there is not 
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the 
fact-fmder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^  12, 985 P.2d 911. 
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in 
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's 
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence 
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, \ 22, 3 P.3d 192. The Utah 
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58, 
f^ 67, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court 
may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts 
in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court 
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction 
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid 
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, 
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the 
defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second 
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case 
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole 
evidence against the defendant consisted of the f$ct that the defendant was the 
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to 
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he 
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the 
Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that 
the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, Stretched to its utmost 
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defdndant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 
P.3d 94 the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined 
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. 
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the firslt weapon was recovered) was 
found, but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had 
the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that 
conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had 
the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if 
indeed it ever existed. Id. at ^ 18. 
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an 
extensive marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is 
undisputed that an illegal substance was found in the freezer at Mr. Quintana's 
home. However, once the police entered the home with a search warrant, the 
officers were unable to locate any fingerprints tying Mr. Quintana to the baggie 
of methamphetamine, nor were the officers able to locate any other 
paraphernalia that would be necessary to distribute meth. (R. 2/28) In addition, 
at the time the officers entered the home, Lisa Spencer and Jeffrey Coles were 
also in the home. (R. 2/93) At no time did the officers ask these individuals if 
the drugs belonged to them and at no time did David Quintana admit the baggie 
in the freezer belonged to him. (R. 2/94) The officers found no scales, no large 
quantities of methamphetamine or no evidence of previous distribution in the 
home. Mr. Quintana cooperated with the officer and truthfully told him his 
drug history. (R. 2/97) Mr. Quintana was not trying to deceive the officers, nor 
was he hiding any drug. 
All of this notwithstanding, the State failed to prove that it was, in fact, 
Mr. Quintana's baggie in the freezer. Further, the only evidence offered to 
charge Mr. Quintana with the intent to distribute charge was that of a 
Confidential Informant. However, the CI, Mr. Anderson, was paid by the Strike 
Force and had a previous record. Further, the testimony offered at trial, the 
officers that searched the Confidential Informant had inconsistent statements. 
One officer testified that Mr. Anderson had a pack of cigarettes on him at the 
time of the controlled buy, one officer testified he had nothing on him, a third 
testified he had a wallet. (R. 2/136) The confidential informant alone is not 
sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Quintana of these drug charges. No Strike 
Force agent or police officer was with the CI at the time of the controlled buy 
to validate the transaction. 
This evidence presented at trial is insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Quintana was associated with the charges of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of 
a controlled substance in a drug free zone. For these reasons, David Quintana 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the David Quintana respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse his conviction for possession with intent to distribute and possession 
in a drug-free zone. 
DATED this day of Septembe 
iNDALL WIJRICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that 1 mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0180, postage 
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EXHIBIT A 
SECOND D I S T R I C T COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
DAVID QUINTANA, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
C a s e N o : 0 0 1 9 0 1 9 4 6 FS 
J u d g e : ALFRED C. VAN WAGENEN 
D a t e : A u g u s t 2 3 , 2 0 0 0 
C l e r k : v e n n a w 
P r o s e c u t o r : WESTMORELAND, RICK T 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
D a t e o f b i r t h : O c t o b e r 2 5 , 1 9 6 0 
V i d e o 
T a p e N u m b e r : G 0 8 2 3 0 0 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/24/2000 Guilty Plea 
3. TAMPER W/ WITNESS/JUROR - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/24/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Case No: 001901946 
Date: Aug 23, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The defendant shall serve a term of 0 - 5 [years in the Utah State 
Prison for each offense, to run concurrently. 
Dated t h i s it day of hkW/bf 
S^TEC I^ITAH i 
COUu'TVOFWEBER / SS 
Cl/flnlvA 
ALFRED JC. VAN WAGENEN 
D i s t r i q t C o u r t J u d g e 
DATED imJ5^ CAVCF^^L 2 ^ 1 ^ / " Z " ' 
CLERK OF THE COURT 1 V " 
BY. 
/ 
.•IICROFiJvl T.--±. 166 PAGEJQ7/J 
RlCi COURT 
r.PR 5 an 8 3 5 -• 
__l_/..^ S^ LlA_^ -iXN'-THE SECOND,JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^nbL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
DAVID D QUINTANA, 
Defendant. 
(Jail) 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE - JUDGMENT 
Date: MARCH 31, 1993 
Case No: 931900140 FS ^ 
Judge: MICHAEL J. GLASMANN 
Clerk: JED 
Reporter: JAMES N JONES 
4> 
HEARING 
This case is before the court for SENTENCING on the charge of 
(1) ATT DIST OF C/S (Third Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is -WILLIAM DAINES. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is CHRIS L SHAW. 
It is the judgment and sentence of the Court that the defendant 
serve a term in the Utah State Prison of 0-5 years, suspended, upon 
successful completion of a term of probation of 3 6 months with the 
following conditions: 
1. The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah 
State Department of Adult probation and Parole and comply strictly 
with its terms and conditions. 
2. The defendant shalA violate no law, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
~. The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections 
.vUCRORLM ROLL 1 6 0 PAIGE 1 97-5 
Case Number: 931900140 FS 
and to the Court whenever required. 
4. The defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of $3 00.00, plus 
a state surcharge of $255.00, for a total fine of $555.00. 
5. The defendant shall pay restitution to the Weber Morgan Strike 
Force in the amount of $25.00. 
6. The defendant shall serve a term in the Weber County Jail of 
30 days, or as an alternative, the 3 0 days may be served at the 
Problems Actions Anonymous Group Facility. In either situation, 
incarceration shall begin on April 5, 1993, by 5:00 p.m. 
7. The defendant shall complete a drug abuse evaluation, approved 
by the Adult Probation and Parole department. 
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and further 
orders as it may deem necessary. 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
the County Sheriff. 
Dated this day of 
JUDGE MICHAEL J. GLASMANN 
2 
